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Up until recently media analysis has paid little attention to their material bases 
in assemblies of machines and infrastructures and global chains of labour. This 
is now changing. The multiplication of always/on, always/there, tablets and 
smart phones has coincided with accelerating climate change and greater 
awareness of the globalisation of economic activity. To properly understand 
how these processes are interrelated two essential conditions need to be met. 
Firstly, we need to locate ‘new’ media in historical perspective and examine the 
ways communication has been shaped by cumulative economic, ecological and 
political processes set in motion by the rise of modern capitalism. Secondly, we 
need to explore how these dynamics have been reproduced and intensifi ed with 
the return of market fundamentalism from the mid-1970s onwards. Having 
sketched this context, the paper goes on to the detail how the leading digital 
companies have played a central role in the restoration of profi tability and have 
exploited the increased degrees of corporate freedom introduced by global mar-
ketization to dominate their spheres of infl uence developing organisational 
forms and operational practices that are creating digital despotisms that are 
coming more and more to resemble medieval city states.
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Missing materialities
Most media research has focused on the institutional formations and symbolic fi elds 
that act as go-betweens, connecting us across distances of geography and history. 
This project has generated two very substantial bodies of theorising and research. 
Institutional analysis explores the operation of media as organised sites of meaning 
making embedded in, and interacting with wider economic and political complexes 
of power. It draws on insights and frameworks from political economy, sociology, 
anthropology, law, and political science to detail the changing structure of the com-
munication industries and their shifting role in the organisation of production, pro-
motion and consumption and the operations of states and governments. Cultural 
analysis unpicks the ways meaning is constructed in language, imagery, sound and 
ritual, variably combined in different expressive forms, and how these symbolic 
resources are drawn on as resources for everyday understanding, self-presentation, 
and social relations.
Both these domains of study remain absolutely foundational for a comprehensive 
analysis of contemporary communication but there is a third dimension of media-
tion that has received less sustained attention: the media’s material base. Media are 
never only institutional and symbolic systems they are also arrays of machines sup-
ported by infrastructural networks. When domestic communications centred around 
a single television set situated in the main living room and a lone telephone con-
nected to a land line, questions of the resources used in their manufacture, the en-
ergy they consumed in use, and the waste and pollution they contributed to when 
they were thrown away, were relatively easily consigned to the background of atten-
tion. For families on average income television sets were ‘big ticket’ purchases, in-
tended to last for years, and only replaced when a major innovation, like the intro-
duction of colour, arrived. In many European societies both energy supply and tel-
ephone services were public utilities with controlled prices. This relatively stable 
situation has been irreversibly upended by the intersection of two major disruptions; 
digitalisation and marketization.
We now live in a communications environment increasingly organised around smart 
phones and tablets, always on/always there devices, which we are urged to discard 
and upgrade on an almost annual basis. The data we generate through continuous 
use is increasingly stored in massive server farms making escalating demands on 
energy and water supplies that are concealed by marketing promoting the seem-
ingly immaterial ‘cloud’. The fact that the rapid expansion of digital media has co-
incided with an escalation of the climate crisis is not an accident. The two are inex-
tricably bound together raising urgent questions about the relations between com-
munication system and environmental integrity.
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In order to properly understand these relations however we need to contextualise 
them. The rollout of digital technologies and the emergence of the internet as a mass 
utility has taken place within the same time fame as the return to market fundamen-
talist models of economic management with far reaching consequences for the ways 
they have been organised and deployed. In opposition to all forms of technological 
determinism needs to begin our analysis not from the introduction of machines and 
infrastructures and their capacities, but from the social interests that decide which 
ideas will be funded, which technological potentials will be actualised and which 
supressed, and who will own and direct them. This is not to say that organisation 
and use can always be pushed in only one direction. As Hans Enzensberger noted, 
technologies may be ‘leaky’ and support alternative visions of their social potential. 
The internet is a classic case in point. We can write its history as a narrative of con-
tinuous struggle between visions of a fl at, horizontal, network of peer-to-peer ex-
change, collaboration, and participation, and the drive by the major communica-
tions companies and platforms to reorganise it as a vertical, top down, channel of 
distribution which appropriates user activity to target advertising appeals and prod-
ucts more effectively. This competition remains open but the advantage lies with 
capital.
In the notebooks Marx compiled in preparation for writing Capital, which we now 
know as the Grundrisse, he sees the organisation of communications playing a piv-
otal role in capital’s incessant drive to expand markets and reduce the ‘dead’ time 
between products leaving the factory and being purchased by consumers.
“Capital by its nature drives beyond every spatial barrier. Thus the creation … of the 
means of communication and transport – the annihilation of space by time – be-
comes and extraordinary necessity for it.” (Marx, 1973/1857–1858: 524)
Note that he separates transportation, which involves the physical carriage of ob-
jects and resources, from communication. He was writing against the background of 
both the rapid development of the telegraph system and the great boom in railway 
building. The telegraph was the fi rst communication technology that did away with 
tangible forms of transmitting messages. There were no written letters, printed 
books, or bulky gifts and with the adoption of Samuel Morse’s code of dots it be-
came a digital system. This led commentators at the time to see it as a thoroughly 
immaterial system in which, to borrow one of Marx’s most famous phrases, ‘every-
thing solid melts into air’ or at least into electric pulses travelling along a wire. The 
fact that its operations depended on very material infrastructures and a specifi c or-
ganisation of labour, was conveniently pushed to the background of attention. There 
were the telegraph machines themselves and the networks of connecting wires and 
undersea cables, the telegraph operators who translated peoples’ written notes into 
Morse’s code at one end and decoded them at the other, and the runners who deliv-
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ered the printed telegrams to their recipients. They depended in turn on the workers 
in the mines who extracted the raw materials required to build the system and the 
energy needed run it, the workers who assembled and maintained it, and those 
 toiling in the salvage and scrap yards searching for reusable components after the 
machines had reached the end of their productive life and been discarded.
Communications may appear to be immaterial when it moves over wired connec-
tions or through the radio spectrum but it is always and everywhere dependent on a 
solid material base of resources and labour. Retrieving the landscapes and lives that 
make up this base, rescuing them from the invisibility that much media theory has 
relegated them to, is an essential fi rst step to crafting a critical analysis of the con-
temporary relations between technologies, economies and ecologies. At the same 
time, we must reject the celebration of the newness of ‘new media’ in much writing 
on digital media with its underlying assumption that we have broken decisively with 
the past and are moving into an entirely different world. To understand our present 
situation we need to return to processes set in motion in the formative period of 
modern capitalism, and to the contradictions at their centre.
Lineages of the present
Critical theory explores the way present conditions are shaped by deep processes of 
transformation that unfold over long loops of time. But these processes may be 
thrown into sharp relief by events within a concentrated period. The year 1776 was 
one such moment.
Three events occurred in that year, unrelated at the time but subsequently binding 
together economies, technologies and ecologies in ways that we are still living with. 
In Scotland Adam Smith published The Wealth of Nations. In England James Watt 
delivered improved versions of his steam engine, incorporating a condensing mech-
anism that increased their effi ciency, to the Bloomfi eld colliery and John Wilkin-
son’s iron works, twin pillars of accelerating industrialisation. And in Philadelphia 
the thirteen American colonies issued the United States Declaration of Independ-
ence affi rming their refusal of Great Britain’s colonial rule.
Smith’s mistake: The costs of self-interest
Smith was a complex and confl icted fi gure who believed that altruism and care for 
others were the highest human values, but the Wealth of Nations was informed by a 
hard-nosed recognition that the emerging economy of capitalism would be pro-
pelled primarily by the pursuit of personal gain. As he noted;
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“It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we 
 expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest. We address our-
selves not to their humanity but to their self-love.” (Smith, 1986/1776: 119)
This entirely realistic assessment posed a problem. What was to stop businesses 
exploiting their workers and customers? Smith’s answer, which he introduced in his 
earlier book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, was to present markets as self-cor-
recting, regulated by an invisible hand that ensured that labour was exchanged for a 
fair wage and commodities for a fair price, and income and wealth distributed justly 
and equitably. In a celebrated passage of wishful thinking he claimed that:
The rich … in spite of their natural selfi shness and rapacity [and] though the 
sole end which they propose from the labours of all the thousands whom they 
employ, be the gratifi cation of their own vain and insatiable desires … are led 
by an invisible hand [emphasis added] to make nearly the same distribution 
of the necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the earth been 
divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants. (Smith, 1969/1759: 
264–265)
Grounded in a thorough-going liberal philosophy of personal freedom Smith’s pri-
ority was to maximise individual choices, of investment and consumption, and min-
imise state interference in the operation of markets. By characterising capitalism as 
a market economy and focussing on the moment of exchange he was able to ignore 
two central features of capitalism that contradict his idealised account.Firstly, com-
petition inevitably gives way to concentration as companies with greater productive 
and fi nancial resources buy up their rivals or force them out of business. Secondly, 
far from the gains of enterprise ‘trickling down’ the social scale, capitalists, if left 
unconstrained, will retain the largest possible share of profi ts for themselves. Rather 
than being governed by an invisible hand capitalism is ruled by an iron fi st of une-
qual accumulation.
Contesting this winner-takes-all mentality has been central to social successive 
movements to install progressive taxation, develop welfare systems, limit corporate 
concentration of ownership, impose public interest regulations on corporate activi-
ty, and organise essential communicative resources as public utilities. These strug-
gles produced these various forms of welfare capitalism that reached their fullest 
development in the years between 1945 and 1975. Across Western Europe the cen-
tral communication systems of broadcasting and telecommunications were publi-
cally owned and operated and income and wealth gaps were closing. Then, in the 
mid-1970s advanced capitalism entered a period of crisis. Advocates of Smith’s 
liberal economics, the so-called new or neo liberals, blamed excessive government 
regulation of corporate enterprise and the ineffi ciencies of public ownership and 
argued for a concerted program of deregulation and privatisation. In Margaret 
22
Medij. istraž. (god. 23, br. 2) 2017. (17-34)
Thatcher in Britain and Ronald Reagan in the US they found enthusiastic political 
champions willing and able to translate theory into practice. Versions of their 
 neoliberal policy template gained ground within Europe and within emerging econ-
omies.
It was precisely at this moment, when neo-liberalism was becoming established as 
the new economic orthodoxy, supported in general terms by social democratic as 
well as conservative administrations, typifi ed by Bill Clinton’s Democratic Presi-
dencies in the United States and Tony Blair’s New Labour Governments in Britain, 
that popular engagement with the internet begins to accelerate and the companies 
that now organise and direct that engagement enter the contest for users’ on-line 
time and attention. The two major forces in personal computing Microsoft and Ap-
ple launched in 1975 and 1976, followed after the World Wide Web became publi-
cally accessible by the key sites organising home shopping, internet search and so-
cial connection: Amazon in 1994, Google in 1998, and Facebook in 2004. These 
fi ve companies now dominate everyday internet use and have played a key role in 
the reconstruction of capitalism.
Watt’s machines: Carbon and climate change
The moment of capitalist crisis in the mid-1970s and its aftermath was also the mo-
ment when global warming, which had been steadily rising since the beginning of 
industrialisation, took a sharp upward turn.
One widely used index of climate change that allows for reliable comparisons over 
time is the volume of carbon dioxide, the major ‘greenhouse gas’, in the atmos-
phere. Calculations by the Nobel Prize winning atmospheric chemist, Paul Crutzen 
and his colleagues have shown that in 1750 the atmospheric concentration of CO2 
stood at 277 ppm (by volume). By 1850 it had climbed 285 ppm and by 1945 it was 
25 ppm above the pre-industrial level, taking it well outside the range of natural 
variability (Steffen, Crutzen and McNeil, 2007: 616). In later papers Crutzen and 
his colleagues identify the years between 1950 and 1973 as a distinctive period of 
accelerating climate change (Steffen, Grinevald, Crutzen and McNeil, 2011: 850), 
and go on to argue that human infl uence on the climate has been most evident in the 
years since 1970 (Gaffney and Steffen, 2017: 4)
Many commentators now date the onset of this ‘great acceleration’ in human im-
pacts on the climate to the central role that steam power played in driving industri-
alisation. Watt’s engines, and their successors, were meta-technologies with multi-
ple applications, from domestic heating, to factory machinery and railway and 
steamship transportation. But because their operation required large volumes of 
coal they shifted energy supply decisively away from the renewable sources pro-
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vided by wind, wood and water and animal and human muscle towards an increas-
ingly reliance on fi nite supplies of fossil fuels, ancient buried forms of carbon that 
had to be brought to the surface. Concentrated sites of extraction, initially coal 
mines and open cast pits and later oil wells to fuel the internal combustion engine, 
the successor to the steam engine, radically altered landscapes and made their own 
substantial contributions to pollution and warming.
This did not go unnoticed at the time. Observing the wholesale clearances of forests 
to make way for the expanding industrial cities and the dense columns of black 
smoke rising from the funnels on the new steam driven railways trains and the chim-
neys of the new factories, Eugene Huzar, a provincial French lawyer, writing in 
1855, foresaw an environmental catastrophe.
“In a hundred or two hundred years the world, crisscrossed by railways and 
steamboats, covered with factories and mills, will emit trillions of cubic me-
ters of carbonic acid and carbon monoxide. And since the forests will have 
been destroyed, all this carbonic acid and carbon monoxide could well 
somewhat perturb the harmony of the world” (quoted in Bonneuil and Fres-
soz, 2016: xii)
It was not until the closing years of the century that scientifi c inquiries were able to 
establish an empirical link between fossil fuels and global warming, but Huzar’s 
argument was more general. He was pointing to the contradiction at the heart of 
modern conceptions of ‘progress’ which measured it in terms of increasing produc-
tivity and technological innovation with little or no regard for the impact on envi-
ronmental integrity. The more successful capitalism was as a system of profi t gen-
eration the more it depleted and degraded fi nite natural resources and contaminated 
the environment. This brute fact was consistently denied by those with a material 
interest in maintaining a system that underpinned their wealth and privilege. Their 
argument appeared plausible because much of the dirty work of primary resource 
extraction, with its environmental and social costs, was located in areas some way 
removed from the centres of comfortable living. You cannot see the Keystone pipe-
line that runs through the ancestral lands of the Sioux peoples in South Dakota, and 
which has just spilled 210,000 gallons of oil, from the corporate skyscrapers of Wall 
Street. This relegation of attention is rooted in a fundamental contradiction in the 
constitution of modern democracies.
Dependent democracy: Republic versus Empire
It is one of the great ironies of modern history that the United States, the fi rst revo-
lutionary republic, should from the outset continue to be caught up in the asymmet-
ric power relations of empire. In 1804, Thomas Jefferson, the principal author of the 
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Declaration of Independence, and by then President, moved to support the French 
empire’s attempts to suppress the successful slave rebellion in Haiti that after more 
than a decade of struggle had established an independent emancipated state on the 
island under the uprising’s leader, Toussaint Louverture. Jefferson feared that it 
would inspire uprisings among the slaves working on American plantations and it 
was not until 1862, following the defeat of the confederate slave states in the Civil 
War that the United States formally recognised Haiti. By then, the relentless push 
westwards had already annexed the prime land and resources of the continent’s na-
tive peoples.
The pursuit of industrialisation also required an aggressive policy of “economic 
imperialism” overseas, backed where necessary by military force, to ensure ready 
supplies of cheap raw materials and labour and compliant new markets. With the 
collapse of the European empires after World War II, this reliance on economic 
pressure and strategic intervention replaced the colonial occupation as the dominant 
strategy for maintaining asymmetric global power relations within a competitive 
arena reconstructed around the fi nancial and trade institutions devised by the Allied 
Powers at the Bretton Woods conference in New Hampshire in 1944. They included 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), the forerunner of the World Trade Organisation. The aim was to 
ensure that the newly independent post-colonial states rejected the communist alter-
natives represented by the Soviet Union and China, and operated within a global 
‘free market’ organised to preserve the historic competitive advantages enjoyed by 
the leading capitalist economies. The result was to per petuate the asymmetric rela-
tions of empire and ensure that supplies of many of the consumer goods that were 
now within the reach of average wage earners in the West continued to rely on raw 
materials and exploited labour in countries where the organisation of extraction and 
production remained largely out of sight and out of mind.
As we noted earlier however, within the leading ‘free market’ nations the early free-
for-all variant of corporate capitalism had been tempered by varying combinations of 
progressive taxation, public interest regulation and public ownership, and strong trade 
union movements. It was this version of ‘welfare capitalism’ that was challenged and 
then dismantled in the wake of the structural crisis of capitalism of the mid-1970s.
Capitalising on crisis: Market fundamentalism
Neoliberal responses to crisis have been characterised by fi ve fundamental interven-
tions in the organisation of capitalism: the redirection of economic activity from the 
public to the corporate sector, the relaxation of regulations governing corporate be-
haviour, the reordering of production and labour, the redistribution of income and 
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wealth to the top of the income and wealth scales, and the acceleration and intensi-
fi cation of domestic consumption.
Firstly, corporations have been allowed to enter areas of activity they were previ-
ously excluded from, substantially increasing their range and extent. Successive 
privatisations have dismantled the public utilities that previously operated key in-
frastructural resources. Telecommunication system have been sold off the private 
investors across the European Union and in Britain, which pioneered this shift, they 
have been joined by the energy and railway systems. Elsewhere, as in France, public 
broadcasting organisations have been sold.
Secondly, the responsibility for disciplining corporations has prioritised self-regula-
tion by the industries rather than independent oversight, and in areas where statu-
tory agencies continues to operate its rationale has shifted from defending the public 
interest to overseeing market operations and addressing market failures.
Thirdly, there have been concerted and consistent corporate efforts to reduce labour 
costs. Trade union rights have been eroded and weakened. Permanent employment 
contracts carrying company responsibilities for holiday pay, sick leave, and pen-
sions, have been increasingly displaced by short-term contracts and ‘outsourcing’ to 
independent contractors and freelance workers who are responsible for securing 
their own cover for illness and their own pensions. The resulting dispersal of the 
workforce has made trade union organisation more diffi cult tilting the balance of 
power in favour of employers, an advantage reinforced by the weakening of legisla-
tion guaranteeing workers’ rights, including the right to strike.
Fourthly, taxation systems have been readjusted to allow companies and high 
net wealth individuals to retain a signifi cantly increased share of profi ts and in-
come from accumulated assets. The rates levied on corporations, high earners, and on 
transfers of wealth, have been progressively reduced while legal loopholes  allowing 
the rich to avoid paying tax or paying only the absolute minimum, have proliferated.
As Thomas Picketty’s (2014) pioneering research has shown, the combination of the 
squeeze on real wages and the redirection of gains to the top, has seen the trend for 
income and wealth gaps to narrow over the period between 1945 and 1975 reversed 
with sharply rising inequalities.
This trend posed problems for the need to boost domestic consumption. In part at 
least, the crisis of the mid 1970s was a crisis of overproduction and under consump-
tion. Over the course of the long post war economic boom, more and more families 
on average incomes had been able to acquire a range of the ‘big ticket’ items; refrig-
erators, television sets, cars, vacuum cleaners and other household appliances. 
These goods were expected to last and were not being replaced. If they broke down 
there were repair shops that would extend their useful life. Deconstructing this sys-
tem of stable domestic consumption was essential to rebooting capitalism.
26
Medij. istraž. (god. 23, br. 2) 2017. (17-34)
This was achieved by a combination of strategies. Firstly, consumption was ex-
panded by accelerating the rate at which items became obsolescent and when they 
broke down it became increasingly diffi cult to fi nd spare parts to repair them since 
in the interim new models had been introduced using new, modifi ed, components. 
Consumers were exhorted to acquire the habit of discarding old models and invest-
ing in the most up-to-date technologies. This new regime of disposability was rein-
forced by a shift in the organisation of product promotion. The basis shifted from 
appeals to utility and value for money to celebrating commodities as extensions of 
the self and necessary props in the theatre of personal presentation. The result was 
a generalised fashion system in which style and appearance became the essential 
currency of social relations and social competition.
Promoting this new consumer system required new forms of publicity and market-
ing that could cement more intimate relations between commodities and consumers. 
One strategy was to intensify branding and the narcissisms of small differences. A 
second was to develop forms of advertising that displayed products as integral to 
desired life styles. New forms of ‘native’ and embedded appeal, led by product 
placement, proliferated.
But there was still the problem of supporting this intensifi cation of consumption 
when real wages were falling and household incomes were being squeezed. The 
solution was to massively expand the volume of consumer credit by issuing a pro-
liferating range of cards that allowed for borrowing against future income to fund 
immediate purchases.
As a result of these interventions neo liberalism set in motion a fundamental shift in 
imagination and values alongside the reconstruction of structural arrangements. 
Drawing on the Google Book Ngram Viewer data base of digitalised books pub-
lished in English in the US and Great Britain from 1800 onwards, Patricia Green-
fi eld (2013) has tracked the changing frequency with which key words indicating 
underlying cultural dispositions appear in print. Up until the mid-1960s ‘give’, with 
its connotations of personal generosity and communality, occurred much more fre-
quently than ‘get’. From the mid-1970s onwards however, uses of ‘get’ showed a 
steep rise while mentions of ‘give’ fell, suggesting a shift towards a more acquisi-
tive, personalised culture (ibid.).
Digital media then, emerged onto an economic and imaginative playing fi eld al-
ready substantially reconstructed, both structurally and culturally, by the return of 
market fundamentalism. The leading digital companies have taken full advantage of 
the new operational freedoms granted to corporations to increasingly dominate pop-
ular communications activity and build concerns that operate on increasingly des-
potic lines.
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Digital despotisms
As numerous commentators have shown, the relaxation of the rules governing 
mergers and acquisitions has led ownership of key production and distribution fa-
cilities in the established print and audio-visual sectors becoming concentrated in 
the hands of a small number of multi-media conglomerates (Birkinbne, Gomez and 
Wasko, 2017). Digital media have benefi tted from the additional advantage that 
governments have seen their rapid expansion as an essential foundation for a post-
industrial economy organised around the production and deployment of information 
and cultural goods and services. This hands-off stance has allowed the companies 
that now dominate popular internet use, Amazon (launched 1994), Google (launched 
1998) and Facebook (launched 2004), to build virtual monopolies in their core areas 
of activity. Their domination has been reinforced by the network effects that encour-
age new users to gravitate to sites that already have the most users. Amazon now 
accounts for half of all on-line payments in the US. Ninety percent of all internet 
searches in Europe and eight eighty eight percent in the US use Google. Three quar-
ters of mobile social media interactions in Western countries are now made on Fa-
cebook which claims to have two billion members world-wide. The income these 
activities generate has propelled these Internet majors to the front rank of the world’s 
largest companies measured by market value. They are joined by Apple and Micro-
soft, the early entrants and still dominant forces in personal computing. The latest 
fi gures rank Apple, Alphabet (Google’s holding company) and Microsoft fi rst, sec-
ond and third, with Amazon in sixth place and Facebook in seventh (Statista, 2017). 
Despite raising additional funds from public stock issues shares carrying votes for 
membership in boards of directors remain securely concentrated in the hands of 
company founders, giving them total control over decision making and strategy.
The digital majors have made concerted efforts to cut production costs by moving 
work overseas taking advantage of the substantially lower wage rates in the emerg-
ing economies of the global South and East opened up by neo liberal globalisation. 
The cost advantages of ‘offshoring’ have been most evident in the organisation of 
routine assembly work. Apple and the other major western companies involved in 
manufacturing smart phones and tablets have all relied heavily on labour employed 
by subcontractors located in Asia. The workers are disproportionately female, often 
recent rural migrants, working long hours with little opportunity for breaks, and 
subject to intense surveillance to ensure that they meet production quotas. This 
structure of exploitation is concealed from the end users of smart phones by the 
 elegant styling and the barrage of advertising promising enhanced features and fo-
cussing consumers’ attention on the value of the object to them in their everyday 
lives (Qiu, 2016).
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The assembly factories however are only one moment in a production chain that 
stretches backwards to the sites where the minerals needed for essential components 
are mined and forwards to the container ships transporting the completed commod-
ities to their retail destinations. Every link in this chain imposes substantial environ-
mental as well as social costs leaving a trail of ravaged landscapes, energy deple-
tion, and air and sea pollution, in its wake.
These social and environmental impacts point up the continuing structural contra-
diction between republic and empire. Once again the material and cultural privi-
leges enjoyed by affl uent consumers in the North are obtained at the cost of the 
continuing exploitation of workers and environmental degradation in the South.
In another major cost cutting move, digital work that has remained based in the 
central economies of the North has been increasingly contracted out to small suppli-
ers or freelance workers. Corporations gain two substantial benefi ts from this trans-
fer. Firstly, they avoid paying for the entitlements to paid holidays, sick pay, mater-
nity leave, and pensions that permanent company employees have secured through 
collective bargaining.Secondly, the direct costs of production fall on the shoulders 
of the contractor hired for a specifi c task or project. They pay for the equipment they 
use, for the purchase or rental of workspace, for the heat, light and energy they con-
sume while working, and for any additional training they may need to upgrade their 
skills. In addition, the conditions of employment are arranged to maximise returns 
to the corporations.
Freelance workers developing applications, ‘apps’, for the mobile phones sold by 
Apple and Google for example, face a number of hurdles in securing a return on 
their labour. Apple insists on approving all apps loaded onto one of their devices. 
One accepted, the developer has to undertake additional work to ensure that their 
app features in the Top 100 lists, using social networks intensively to promote them-
selves and ensure that they are noticed. Developers set the price for the applications 
they produce but Apple takes thirty per cent of the sale revenues as payment for 
access to their platform.
There is old saying that has always applied to unequal access to job opportunities, 
that it is ‘not what you know, but who you know’. Because it organises labour on a 
project by project basis outsourcing has signifi cantly increased the importance of 
integration into the key social networks that determine professional reputation and 
allocate job opportunities. Possession of social capital is now essential. This works 
to the advantage of workers who already have established ties through family, 
shared education, or work on past projects, and can devote signifi cant time and en-
ergy to cultivating and maintaining new connections. It works to the disadvantage 
of workers from poor or ethnic minority families whose social background has ex-
cluded them from circles of infl uence.
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Labour that continues to be based within plants operated by the major digital com-
panies has been increasingly divided into a restricted strata of workers on perma-
nent contracts and an expanding group operating on temporary or fi xed term ar-
rangements, erecting resilient divisions between different levels of job security, pay 
and conditions. In 2000, 11% of the workforce at Microsoft’s operating branch near 
Seattle were hired from outside agencies and were on temporary contracts. Some 
were earning less than the recognised living wage and, in a very visible signal of 
their separate status, were required to wear orange identity badges, in contrast the 
blue badges carried by permanent staff.
The digital majors have also been in the forefront of the drive to restore general 
levels of corporate profi tability by intensifying and accelerating consumption. Their 
ability to assemble text, image, voice and sound in entirely new ways to employ 
interactivity to develop engaging and immersive user experiences, and to construct 
detailed user profi les, has had three major impacts.
Firstly, it has erased the traditional lines separating editorial and creative content 
from promotional materials and generated multiple strategies designed to integrate 
product appeals into cultural forms. Advergames, sponsored video, product place-
ments and other form of ‘native’ advertising naturalise promotion. It no longer ap-
pears a readily identifi able invitation to consume displayed on billboards and maga-
zine pages that can be passed over or in television ads that can be skipped. It is al-
ways now present on screen, an integral element in engaging narratives and games, 
continually cementing associations between brands, lifestyles and self-conceptions.
Secondly, interactivity has allowed companies to capitalise on the energy, enthusi-
asm and expertise of users to co-op them as unpaid labourers, contributing ideas for 
product developments or modifi cations and acting as ‘brand ambassadors’ promot-
ing products to friends on line through recommendations and ‘likes’.
Thirdly, the business model of Google and Facebook depends on collecting all the 
data generated by users’ activities and analysing it to develop personalised profi les 
that can then be used to micro manage promotional appeals tailored to tap into 
known preferences and interests. The promised effi ciency of this fi ne targeting has 
persuaded many advertisers to redirect their spending on-line precipitating a crisis 
in the newspaper industry with local titles closing on a daily basis and nationals cut-
ting back on staff.
These strategies have made a major contribution to increasing general levels of 
consumption, an outcome reinforced by the recent arrival of ‘frictionless’ payments 
using smart phones, the latest stage in the transition from coins and banknotes, 
through credit cards, to screen based recognition designed to reduce to a minimum 
the time allocated to reconsideration and second thoughts. As an old slogan for an 
early electronic payment system on US cable television promised: ‘You see it, you 
want, you click, you have it.’
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In addition to playing a central role in accelerating general consumption however 
digital media have made a substantial contribution in their own right. The ubiquity 
of always/on always /there tablets and smart phones has multiplied the number of 
appliances in circulation and use adding signifi cantly to demands on scarce resourc-
es and energy supplies. The increasing rapidity with which these machines are up-
graded and new models introduced has also signifi cantly accelerated disposal rates 
compounding problems of waste. The latest Apple iPhone is the ninth to be released. 
Compact discs and DVDs, which replaced cassette and video tapes, are now them-
selves being displaced by streaming as the preferred mode of access to recorded 
music, fi lm and television.
Google and Facebook’s ability to fi ne tune the cultural materials that users see on 
screen goes beyond advertising to cover news and comment. By insisting that they are 
platforms not publishers they have so far resisted pressure to abide by the editorial 
protocols and values that govern print and broadcast journalism using their economic 
leverage to lobby aggressively to head off any legislative initiatives that might cut 
across their operations. In the US the Big Five digital concerns currently outspend 
both the leading fi ve banks and the leading fi ve oil companies on lobbying elected 
representatives and government agencies. They support their claims to exemption by 
emphasising that their gatekeeping relies on supposedly ‘objective’ computer algo-
rithms rather than fallible human decisions. There are several obvious problems with 
this argument. Firstly, computer programs are social constructs and are likely to repro-
duce the blind spots of their creators. Secondly, unlike conventional editorial decision 
these biases remain invisible and unavailable to argument and challenge. This re-
moval from open scrutiny is reinforced by the fact that the composition of these algo-
rithms is commercially privileged and protected by intellectual property law.
As recent incidents have demonstrated, the failure of algorithmic sorting to take any 
account of context or intention can produce perverse results. Facebook’s standing 
prohibition on depictions of nudity led to the deletion of one of the most famous 
news photographs from the war in Vietnam showing a small girl running naked to-
wards the camera during a napalm attack on her village. The photo had been posted 
by a Norwegian journalist as part of a serious discussion of the role of photography 
in confl ict zones. Evidence to a recent US Congressional select committee revealed 
that in 2016, between September 1 and November 15, 37,000 automatic ‘bot’ ac-
counts based in Russia released 1.4 million fabricated ‘tweets’ impersonating news 
organisations and political parties and groups (Booth et al., 2017). These distor-
tions, coupled with the direction of material to users on the basis of their expressed 
preferences locking them into echo chambers that endlessly reproduce already en-
dorsed opinions, destroys the possibility of open deliberation on contentious issues 
essential to a fully functioning democracy. In its place the digital majors are creating 
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a new despotism in which their business models decide what users of the now cen-
tral media of communication will encounter, see and read.
This erosion of the ideal of citizenship as a social contract that balances guarantees 
of individual right against the responsibility to contribute to the quality of collective 
life, is compounded by the digital major’s exclusive claim to the personal data gen-
erated on line. Every click on the keyboard or swipe across the screen adds to the 
store of information about us that these corporations hold reinforcing a markedly 
asymmetric relation of power. While they know more and more, their operations 
remain opaque and invisible, securely sealed by commercial privilege. We all now 
have two identities, our physical selves and our digital doubles. Increasingly they 
are pitched against each other. As a recent study of Facebook concluded, “the pre-
dictability of individual attributes from digital records of behaviour may have con-
siderable negative implications … One can imagine situations in which such predic-
tions, even if incorrect, could pose a threat to an individual’s well-being, freedom or 
even life” (Kosinski, Stillwell and Thore, 2013: 5805). These ‘threats’ may include 
denial of insurance, inability to secure a loan, refusal of employment, or classifi ca-
tion as a suspected danger to public order.
This structure of radical information inequalities is currently being reinforced by the 
rapid growth of intelligent machines and the internet of things. The proliferation of 
drones, smart appliances, and self-driving vehicles will massively increase the vol-
ume of personal information available for commercial analysis and use. It will also 
add signifi cantly to the environmental pressures on scare resources and energy sup-
plies and to problems of disposability and waste.
Those now in charge of the leading digital companies are coming more and more to 
resemble feudal despots. Like the kings and princes of old they are separated from the 
lives of ordinary people by immense wealth. Bill Gates of Microsoft and Jeff Bezos of 
Amazon, together with the fund manager Warren Buffet, an early investor in digital 
enterprises, are currently the three richest men in the United States with a combined 
wealth equal to that held by the 160 million people relegated to the bottom half of the 
society (Collin and Hoxie, 2017). While they can no longer lay claim to divine right 
the leading digital entrepreneurs insist on the supreme agency of technology. Peter 
Thiel, a prominent fi gure in the Silicon Valley community has proclaimed with his 
customary bluntness that “Humans are distinguished from other species by our ability 
to work miracles. We call those miracles technology” (quoted in Earle 2017: 3). But 
as he has been quick to add that realising these miracles’ full potential and making sure 
they are employed productively requires minimum interference from government. As 
he argued in a 2009 essay, “The fate of our world may depend on the effort [to] build 
or propagate the machinery of freedom that makes the world safe for capitalism.” 
(Thiel, 2009) In pursuit of this goal he has advocated relocating digital enterprise to 
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artifi cial ocean islands beyond the jurisdiction of any national government. He has 
been joined in his desire to emancipate himself from democratic accountability by 
Larry Page of Google who has called for territory to be set aside for testing new ideas 
unhindered by political oversight and by the venture capitalist Tim Draper who has 
argued for Silicon Valley constituting itself as an independent state.
These ideas point to digital majors’ increasing sense of themselves as institutions 
apart, detached from responsibility to contribute to common resources in the coun-
tries where they operate, a stance confi rmed by their taxation strategies. They have 
consistently minimised the tax they pay by taking full advantage of the legal avoid-
ance systems that have been integral to the redistribution of income and wealth up-
wards under neo liberalism. In 2014 Facebook’s operations in the UK paid only 
£4,327 in corporation tax, less than the average British worker. In contrast, that 
same year the company’s UK employees received a total of £35million in bonuses.
The comparison with the city states of medieval Italy is entirely apposite. Like 
Medici of Florence the digital majors see themselves as pioneers of new knowledge 
and invention exercising absolute power over their domains safely enclosed behind 
protective walls. Dismantling those walls and redeploying digital technologies in 
the service of social and economic justice and shared responsibility for the integrity 
of the natural environment is one of the central struggles of our time.
NOTES
1 This paper was originally delivered as a lecture at the Faculty of Social Sciences 
(University of Ljubljana, November 22, 2016) and I would like to thank the or-
ganisers for giving me the opportunity to think through ideas I had been working 
on for some time. I am also grateful to the audience for searching questions and 
discussion that promoted me to revisit some of my assumptions. I have taken the 
opportunity of preparing the speech for publication to develop and clarify the 
core arguments and add new material and examples.
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Komuniciranje, kriza i kontrola: 




Dosad su medijske analize posvećivale malo pažnje materijalnim bazama u 
sklapanju strojeva, infrastrukturi i svjetskim lancima proizvodnje. To se sada 
mijenja. Porast vječno uključenih, vječno dostupnih tableta i pametnih telefona 
podudara se s ubrzanim klimatskim promjenama i većom svijesti o globalizaciji 
ekonomskih aktivnosti. Kako bismo mogli razumjeti kako su ti procesi međusob-
no povezani moraju biti zadovoljena dva osnova uvjeta. Prvo, moramo smjesti-
ti “nove” medije u povijesni okvir i proučiti kako su komuniciranje oblikovali 
promjenjivi ekonomski, ekološki i politički procesi koje je pokrenuo uzlet moder-
nog kapitalizma. Drugo, moramo istražiti kako su se taj razvoj umnožavao i 
osnaživao s povratkom tržišnog fundamentalizma od sredine 1970-ih do danas. 
Nakon skiciranja konteksta, ovaj rad se detaljno bavi time kako su vodeće digi-
talne kompanije odigrale ključnu ulogu u obnovi profi tabilnosti i kako su isko-
ristile veći razmjer korporacijskih sloboda, koje je donijela globalna marketiza-
cija, kako bi zavladali svojim sferama utjecaja osnivajući organizacijske oblike 
i operacionalne prakse, koje stvaraju digitalni despotizam koji sve više i više 
sliči srednjovjekovnim gradovima-državama.
Ključne riječi:  digitalni mediji, tržišni fundamentalizam, medijska materijalnost, 
klimatske promjene, iskorištavanje radne snage, pojačana potrošnja
